A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive
Søren Kierkegaard’s account of religious faith emphasises the role of the subject’s will and emotion in belief formation. His appeal to subjectivity is often criticised to be a disregard for objective notions of truth, which has resulted in the evaluation of his account as irrational. While Kierkega...
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| Format: | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| Language: | English |
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Nanyang Technological University
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147345 |
| _version_ | 1811681763171237888 |
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| author | Chua, Davina Jia Yun |
| author2 | Dimitris Apostolopoulos |
| author_facet | Dimitris Apostolopoulos Chua, Davina Jia Yun |
| author_sort | Chua, Davina Jia Yun |
| collection | NTU |
| description | Søren Kierkegaard’s account of religious faith emphasises the role of the subject’s will and emotion in belief formation. His appeal to subjectivity is often criticised to be a disregard for objective notions of truth, which has resulted in the evaluation of his account as irrational. While Kierkegaard has acknowledged his view that faith is necessarily irrational, the sense of irrationality to which he refers is that of an appeal to the non-cognitive. In this paper, I hope to show that Kierkegaard’s appeal to the non-cognitive reliability of the subjective does not reject objective notions of truth, but serves as his argument for an expansion of existing notions of rationality to include alternative modes of truth, particularly that of the subjective perspective. Insofar as concerns pertaining to existential inquiry are those in which the subjective perspective is decisive, I offer an argument in support of Kierkegaard’s view by considering how the intentional perception of some object by a subject allows for a meaningful intelligibility of that object to her, and which informs her of something true about the object for her. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:46:07Z |
| format | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| id | ntu-10356/147345 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:46:07Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Nanyang Technological University |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1473452023-03-11T20:09:19Z A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive Chua, Davina Jia Yun Dimitris Apostolopoulos School of Humanities d.apostolopoulos@ntu.edu.sg Humanities::Philosophy Søren Kierkegaard’s account of religious faith emphasises the role of the subject’s will and emotion in belief formation. His appeal to subjectivity is often criticised to be a disregard for objective notions of truth, which has resulted in the evaluation of his account as irrational. While Kierkegaard has acknowledged his view that faith is necessarily irrational, the sense of irrationality to which he refers is that of an appeal to the non-cognitive. In this paper, I hope to show that Kierkegaard’s appeal to the non-cognitive reliability of the subjective does not reject objective notions of truth, but serves as his argument for an expansion of existing notions of rationality to include alternative modes of truth, particularly that of the subjective perspective. Insofar as concerns pertaining to existential inquiry are those in which the subjective perspective is decisive, I offer an argument in support of Kierkegaard’s view by considering how the intentional perception of some object by a subject allows for a meaningful intelligibility of that object to her, and which informs her of something true about the object for her. Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 2021-03-31T05:39:24Z 2021-03-31T05:39:24Z 2021 Final Year Project (FYP) Chua, D. J. Y. (2021). A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147345 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147345 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University |
| spellingShingle | Humanities::Philosophy Chua, Davina Jia Yun A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title | A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title_full | A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title_fullStr | A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title_short | A Kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth-conducive |
| title_sort | kierkegaardian account of the subjective perspective as truth conducive |
| topic | Humanities::Philosophy |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147345 |
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