Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE
This study investigates a new side-channel leakage observed in the inner rounds of an unrolled hardware implementation of block ciphers in a chosen-input attack scenario. The side-channel leakage occurs in the first round and it can be observed in the later inner rounds because it arises from path a...
Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
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2021
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147414 |
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author | Yli-Mäyry, Ville Ueno, Rei Miura, Noriyuki Nagata, Makoto Bhasin, Shivam Mathieu, Yves Graba, Tarik Danger, Jean-Luc Homma, Naofumi |
author2 | Temasek Laboratories @ NTU |
author_facet | Temasek Laboratories @ NTU Yli-Mäyry, Ville Ueno, Rei Miura, Noriyuki Nagata, Makoto Bhasin, Shivam Mathieu, Yves Graba, Tarik Danger, Jean-Luc Homma, Naofumi |
author_sort | Yli-Mäyry, Ville |
collection | NTU |
description | This study investigates a new side-channel leakage observed in the inner rounds of an unrolled hardware implementation of block ciphers in a chosen-input attack scenario. The side-channel leakage occurs in the first round and it can be observed in the later inner rounds because it arises from path activation bias caused by the difference between two consecutive inputs. Therefore, a new attack that exploits the leakage is possible even for unrolled implementations equipped with countermeasures (masking and/or deglitchers that separate the circuit in terms of glitch propagation) in the round involving the leakage. We validate the existence of such a unique side-channel leakage through a set of experiments with a fully unrolled PRINCE cipher hardware, implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). In addition, we verify the validity and evaluate the hardware cost of a countermeasure for the unrolled implementation, namely the Threshold Implementation (TI) countermeasure. |
first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:50:42Z |
format | Journal Article |
id | ntu-10356/147414 |
institution | Nanyang Technological University |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:50:42Z |
publishDate | 2021 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | ntu-10356/1474142021-04-10T20:12:12Z Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE Yli-Mäyry, Ville Ueno, Rei Miura, Noriyuki Nagata, Makoto Bhasin, Shivam Mathieu, Yves Graba, Tarik Danger, Jean-Luc Homma, Naofumi Temasek Laboratories @ NTU Engineering::Computer science and engineering Hardware Security Ciphers This study investigates a new side-channel leakage observed in the inner rounds of an unrolled hardware implementation of block ciphers in a chosen-input attack scenario. The side-channel leakage occurs in the first round and it can be observed in the later inner rounds because it arises from path activation bias caused by the difference between two consecutive inputs. Therefore, a new attack that exploits the leakage is possible even for unrolled implementations equipped with countermeasures (masking and/or deglitchers that separate the circuit in terms of glitch propagation) in the round involving the leakage. We validate the existence of such a unique side-channel leakage through a set of experiments with a fully unrolled PRINCE cipher hardware, implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). In addition, we verify the validity and evaluate the hardware cost of a countermeasure for the unrolled implementation, namely the Threshold Implementation (TI) countermeasure. Published version 2021-04-08T06:04:30Z 2021-04-08T06:04:30Z 2020 Journal Article Yli-Mäyry, V., Ueno, R., Miura, N., Nagata, M., Bhasin, S., Mathieu, Y., Graba, T., Danger, J. & Homma, N. (2020). Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE. IEEE Transactions On Information Forensics and Security, 16, 1351-1364. https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2020.3033441 1556-6021 0000-0002-9754-6792 0000-0002-0072-6114 0000-0002-0625-9107 0000-0001-5063-7964 0000-0003-0864-3126 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147414 10.1109/TIFS.2020.3033441 2-s2.0-85097795534 16 1351 1364 en IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. application/pdf |
spellingShingle | Engineering::Computer science and engineering Hardware Security Ciphers Yli-Mäyry, Ville Ueno, Rei Miura, Noriyuki Nagata, Makoto Bhasin, Shivam Mathieu, Yves Graba, Tarik Danger, Jean-Luc Homma, Naofumi Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title | Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title_full | Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title_fullStr | Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title_full_unstemmed | Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title_short | Diffusional side-channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers : a case study of power analysis on PRINCE |
title_sort | diffusional side channel leakage from unrolled lightweight block ciphers a case study of power analysis on prince |
topic | Engineering::Computer science and engineering Hardware Security Ciphers |
url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147414 |
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