SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers

Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect agains...

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Main Authors: Bhasin, Shivam, Breier, Jakub, Hou, Xiaolu, Jap, Dirmanto, Poussier, Romain, Sim, Siang Meng
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147426
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author Bhasin, Shivam
Breier, Jakub
Hou, Xiaolu
Jap, Dirmanto
Poussier, Romain
Sim, Siang Meng
author2 School of Computer Science and Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Science and Engineering
Bhasin, Shivam
Breier, Jakub
Hou, Xiaolu
Jap, Dirmanto
Poussier, Romain
Sim, Siang Meng
author_sort Bhasin, Shivam
collection NTU
description Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect against such attacks, countermeasure designers have developed protection methods, such as masking and hiding, to make the attacks harder. However, due to significant overheads, these protections are sometimes deployed only at the beginning and the end of encryption, which are the main targets for side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present a methodology for side-channel assisted differential cryptanalysis attack to target middle rounds of block cipher implementations. Such method presents a powerful attack vector against designs that normally only protect the beginning and end rounds of ciphers. We generalize the attack to SPN based ciphers and calculate the effort the attacker needs to recover the secret key. We provide experimental results on 8-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers. We provide case studies on state-of-the-art symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, SKINNY, and PRESENT. Furthermore, we show how to attack shuffling-protected implementations.
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spelling ntu-10356/1474262021-04-10T20:12:07Z SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers Bhasin, Shivam Breier, Jakub Hou, Xiaolu Jap, Dirmanto Poussier, Romain Sim, Siang Meng School of Computer Science and Engineering Temasek Laboratories @ NTU Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Cryptography Side-channel Analysis Middle Rounds Attack Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect against such attacks, countermeasure designers have developed protection methods, such as masking and hiding, to make the attacks harder. However, due to significant overheads, these protections are sometimes deployed only at the beginning and the end of encryption, which are the main targets for side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present a methodology for side-channel assisted differential cryptanalysis attack to target middle rounds of block cipher implementations. Such method presents a powerful attack vector against designs that normally only protect the beginning and end rounds of ciphers. We generalize the attack to SPN based ciphers and calculate the effort the attacker needs to recover the secret key. We provide experimental results on 8-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers. We provide case studies on state-of-the-art symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, SKINNY, and PRESENT. Furthermore, we show how to attack shuffling-protected implementations. National Research Foundation (NRF) Published version The authors acknowledge the support from the Singapore National Research Foundation(“SOCure” grant NRF2018NCR-NCR002-0001 – www.green-ic.org/socure). 2021-04-06T07:03:22Z 2021-04-06T07:03:22Z 2019 Journal Article Bhasin, S., Breier, J., Hou, X., Jap, D., Poussier, R. & Sim, S. M. (2019). SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers. IACR Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2020(1), 95-122. https://dx.doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2020.i1.95-122 2569-2925 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147426 10.13154/tches.v2020.i1.95-122 1 2020 95 122 en IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems © 2019 Shivam Bhasin, Jakub Breier, Xiaolu Hou, Dirmanto Jap, Romain Poussier, Siang Meng Sim. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. application/pdf
spellingShingle Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Cryptography
Side-channel Analysis
Middle Rounds Attack
Bhasin, Shivam
Breier, Jakub
Hou, Xiaolu
Jap, Dirmanto
Poussier, Romain
Sim, Siang Meng
SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title_full SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title_fullStr SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title_full_unstemmed SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title_short SITM : See-In-The-Middle side-channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers
title_sort sitm see in the middle side channel assisted middle round differential cryptanalysis on spn block ciphers
topic Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Cryptography
Side-channel Analysis
Middle Rounds Attack
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/147426
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