Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion

In this paper, we investigate how increasing transparency about managers’ treatment of their employees affects the tendency of employees to initiate collusion. Building on behavioral economics theory, we argue that employees who are treated less kindly by their managers are more willing to initiate...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Maas, Victor S., Yin, Huaxiang
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152149
_version_ 1811683744432521216
author Maas, Victor S.
Yin, Huaxiang
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Maas, Victor S.
Yin, Huaxiang
author_sort Maas, Victor S.
collection NTU
description In this paper, we investigate how increasing transparency about managers’ treatment of their employees affects the tendency of employees to initiate collusion. Building on behavioral economics theory, we argue that employees who are treated less kindly by their managers are more willing to initiate or join a collusive agreement. We hypothesize that internal transparency affects collusion in two ways. First, by revealing how kindly employees are treated by their managers, transparency increases or decreases the probability that individuals are singled out as potential “partners in crime.” Second, increasing transparency incentivizes managers to treat employees more kindly, which in turn reduces employees’ inclination to initiate collusion. The results of two experiments generally support the theory. We discuss the implications of our study for research and practice.
first_indexed 2024-10-01T04:17:36Z
format Journal Article
id ntu-10356/152149
institution Nanyang Technological University
language English
last_indexed 2024-10-01T04:17:36Z
publishDate 2021
record_format dspace
spelling ntu-10356/1521492023-05-19T07:31:18Z Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion Maas, Victor S. Yin, Huaxiang Nanyang Business School Accounting Business::Accounting Reciprocity Collusion Fraud Internal Transparency Experiment In this paper, we investigate how increasing transparency about managers’ treatment of their employees affects the tendency of employees to initiate collusion. Building on behavioral economics theory, we argue that employees who are treated less kindly by their managers are more willing to initiate or join a collusive agreement. We hypothesize that internal transparency affects collusion in two ways. First, by revealing how kindly employees are treated by their managers, transparency increases or decreases the probability that individuals are singled out as potential “partners in crime.” Second, increasing transparency incentivizes managers to treat employees more kindly, which in turn reduces employees’ inclination to initiate collusion. The results of two experiments generally support the theory. We discuss the implications of our study for research and practice. Published version 2021-12-10T15:10:02Z 2021-12-10T15:10:02Z 2021 Journal Article Maas, V. S. & Yin, H. (2021). Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion. Accounting, Organizations and Society. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2021.101293 0361-3682 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152149 10.1016/j.aos.2021.101293 en Accounting, Organizations and Society © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). application/pdf
spellingShingle Business::Accounting
Reciprocity
Collusion
Fraud
Internal Transparency
Experiment
Maas, Victor S.
Yin, Huaxiang
Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title_full Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title_fullStr Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title_full_unstemmed Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title_short Finding partners in crime? How transparency about managers' behavior affects employee collusion
title_sort finding partners in crime how transparency about managers behavior affects employee collusion
topic Business::Accounting
Reciprocity
Collusion
Fraud
Internal Transparency
Experiment
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/152149
work_keys_str_mv AT maasvictors findingpartnersincrimehowtransparencyaboutmanagersbehavioraffectsemployeecollusion
AT yinhuaxiang findingpartnersincrimehowtransparencyaboutmanagersbehavioraffectsemployeecollusion