Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology
This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas d...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2022
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/157043 |
| _version_ | 1811688251079000064 |
|---|---|
| author | Stepien, Rafal K. |
| author2 | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies |
| author_facet | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Stepien, Rafal K. |
| author_sort | Stepien, Rafal K. |
| collection | NTU |
| description | This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that object) by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:29:14Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/157043 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:29:14Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1570432023-03-05T17:23:51Z Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology Stepien, Rafal K. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Humanities::Philosophy Substantialism Essentialism This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that object) by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka. Submitted/Accepted version 2022-05-01T04:18:40Z 2022-05-01T04:18:40Z 2021 Journal Article Stepien, R. K. (2021). Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49(5), 871-893. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09483-0 0022-1791 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/157043 10.1007/s10781-021-09483-0 2-s2.0-85115690881 5 49 871 893 en Journal of Indian Philosophy © 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Indian Philosophy and is made available with permission of The Author(s). application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Humanities::Philosophy Substantialism Essentialism Stepien, Rafal K. Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title | Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title_full | Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title_fullStr | Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title_full_unstemmed | Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title_short | Substantialism, essentialism, emptiness: buddhist critiques of ontology |
| title_sort | substantialism essentialism emptiness buddhist critiques of ontology |
| topic | Humanities::Philosophy Substantialism Essentialism |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/157043 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stepienrafalk substantialismessentialismemptinessbuddhistcritiquesofontology |