The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion
Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” infe...
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160057 |
| _version_ | 1826121840159883264 |
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| author | Chen, Melvin |
| author2 | School of Humanities |
| author_facet | School of Humanities Chen, Melvin |
| author_sort | Chen, Melvin |
| collection | NTU |
| description | Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” inferences is violated in every possible instance, from which it follows that Hume’s is-ought thesis must be false. In this article, I will formulate a logically rigorous version of Hume’s is-ought thesis, introduce Prior-style counterexamples, and suggest how they might demonstrate the falsity of Hume’s is-ought thesis, identify the substitution criterion, and develop at length the unrestricted and restricted versions of this criterion as it is applied by Pigden and Schurz. Thereafter, I will outline Schurz’s defence of the is-ought gap in accordance with his interpretation of the substitution criterion, before introducing a more sophisticated version of Prior-style objections, proposing a possible response from Pigden, identifying the costs of Pigden’s response and counter proposing a response on behalf of Schurz through an extension of his approach, and offering concluding remarks. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:38:45Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/160057 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:38:45Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1600572022-07-12T04:34:33Z The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion Chen, Melvin School of Humanities Humanities::Philosophy Is-Ought Substitution Criterion Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” inferences is violated in every possible instance, from which it follows that Hume’s is-ought thesis must be false. In this article, I will formulate a logically rigorous version of Hume’s is-ought thesis, introduce Prior-style counterexamples, and suggest how they might demonstrate the falsity of Hume’s is-ought thesis, identify the substitution criterion, and develop at length the unrestricted and restricted versions of this criterion as it is applied by Pigden and Schurz. Thereafter, I will outline Schurz’s defence of the is-ought gap in accordance with his interpretation of the substitution criterion, before introducing a more sophisticated version of Prior-style objections, proposing a possible response from Pigden, identifying the costs of Pigden’s response and counter proposing a response on behalf of Schurz through an extension of his approach, and offering concluding remarks. 2022-07-12T04:34:33Z 2022-07-12T04:34:33Z 2021 Journal Article Chen, M. (2021). The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion. South African Journal of Philosophy, 40(3), 254-264. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.1949558 0258-0136 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160057 10.1080/02580136.2021.1949558 2-s2.0-85114331739 3 40 254 264 en South African Journal of Philosophy © South African Journal of Philosophy. All rights reserved. |
| spellingShingle | Humanities::Philosophy Is-Ought Substitution Criterion Chen, Melvin The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title | The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title_full | The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title_fullStr | The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title_full_unstemmed | The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title_short | The is-ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| title_sort | is ought gap and the substitution criterion |
| topic | Humanities::Philosophy Is-Ought Substitution Criterion |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160057 |
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