Competitive disclosure of correlated information
We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective proposals, which are positively correlated. The information externality—the news disclosed by one sender contains inform...
Main Authors: | Au, Pak Hung, Kawai, Keiichi |
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Other Authors: | School of Social Sciences |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2022
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160704 |
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