Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA
With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret ke...
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| Muut tekijät: | |
| Aineistotyyppi: | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| Kieli: | English |
| Julkaistu: |
Nanyang Technological University
2023
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| Aiheet: | |
| Linkit: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 |
| _version_ | 1826124902520848384 |
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| author | Teo, Yu Han |
| author2 | Gwee Bah Hwee |
| author_facet | Gwee Bah Hwee Teo, Yu Han |
| author_sort | Teo, Yu Han |
| collection | NTU |
| description | With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret key. I n this project, we explore the vulnerabilities of the MAX 10 FPGA to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Specifically, we focus on the Last Round Hamming Distance attack, which exploits the electromagnetic radiation emitted during the encryption process to infer information about the secret key. We successfully perform an SCA on the MAX 10 FPGA and recover the secret key, demonstrating the effectiveness of this attack on this device. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:27:57Z |
| format | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| id | ntu-10356/167522 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:27:57Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Nanyang Technological University |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1675222023-07-07T15:45:29Z Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA Teo, Yu Han Gwee Bah Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering ebhgwee@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering With the increasing number of devices relying on cryptography to protect sensitive information, the risk of side-channel attacks (SCA) is also on the rise. SCAs exploit the variations in the physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms to extract sensitive information, including the secret key. I n this project, we explore the vulnerabilities of the MAX 10 FPGA to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Specifically, we focus on the Last Round Hamming Distance attack, which exploits the electromagnetic radiation emitted during the encryption process to infer information about the secret key. We successfully perform an SCA on the MAX 10 FPGA and recover the secret key, demonstrating the effectiveness of this attack on this device. Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical and Electronic Engineering) 2023-05-29T07:19:49Z 2023-05-29T07:19:49Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Teo, Y. H. (2023). Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University |
| spellingShingle | Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering Teo, Yu Han Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title | Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title_full | Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title_fullStr | Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title_full_unstemmed | Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title_short | Electromagnetic side-channel attack on intel FPGA |
| title_sort | electromagnetic side channel attack on intel fpga |
| topic | Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167522 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT teoyuhan electromagneticsidechannelattackonintelfpga |