Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device
AES, a widely used encryption technique, is used to safeguard sensitive data in a variety of applications. It is nevertheless susceptible to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, which try to take advantage of physical weaknesses in a cryptosystem by examining elements like time intervals, power usag...
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| Format: | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| Language: | English |
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Nanyang Technological University
2023
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167630 |
| _version_ | 1826112763309588480 |
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| author | Lau, Li Hao |
| author2 | Gwee Bah Hwee |
| author_facet | Gwee Bah Hwee Lau, Li Hao |
| author_sort | Lau, Li Hao |
| collection | NTU |
| description | AES, a widely used encryption technique, is used to safeguard sensitive data in a variety of applications. It is nevertheless susceptible to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, which try to take advantage of physical weaknesses in a cryptosystem by examining elements like time intervals, power usage monitoring, and electromagnetic emissions. It was shown in previous studies that certain lightweight embedded systems could be attacked via SCA, thus in this study, we seek to determine if the cryptographic keys used in AES encryption on a lightweight operating system (OS) like the Raspberry Pi (RPi) OS, can be retrieved from any side-channel leakage. To see if SCA is possible, we restrict the plaintext to 16 bytes and go through the encryption process numerous times.
The report includes a review of the literature, hardware and software configurations for the experimental procedures, implementation and analysis of the results, and a conclusion with suggestions for future research. It will reveal that the SCA methods used in this research were insufficient to retrieve the encryption key and potential factors which may be attributed to this result. The study's conclusions will contribute to making lightweight systems' AES encryption more secure. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:12:27Z |
| format | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| id | ntu-10356/167630 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:12:27Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Nanyang Technological University |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1676302023-07-07T17:53:08Z Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device Lau, Li Hao Gwee Bah Hwee School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering ebhgwee@ntu.edu.sg Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Computer hardware, software and systems AES, a widely used encryption technique, is used to safeguard sensitive data in a variety of applications. It is nevertheless susceptible to side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, which try to take advantage of physical weaknesses in a cryptosystem by examining elements like time intervals, power usage monitoring, and electromagnetic emissions. It was shown in previous studies that certain lightweight embedded systems could be attacked via SCA, thus in this study, we seek to determine if the cryptographic keys used in AES encryption on a lightweight operating system (OS) like the Raspberry Pi (RPi) OS, can be retrieved from any side-channel leakage. To see if SCA is possible, we restrict the plaintext to 16 bytes and go through the encryption process numerous times. The report includes a review of the literature, hardware and software configurations for the experimental procedures, implementation and analysis of the results, and a conclusion with suggestions for future research. It will reveal that the SCA methods used in this research were insufficient to retrieve the encryption key and potential factors which may be attributed to this result. The study's conclusions will contribute to making lightweight systems' AES encryption more secure. Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical and Electronic Engineering) 2023-05-31T05:39:39Z 2023-05-31T05:39:39Z 2023 Final Year Project (FYP) Lau, L. H. (2023). Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167630 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167630 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University |
| spellingShingle | Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Computer hardware, software and systems Lau, Li Hao Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title | Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title_full | Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title_fullStr | Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title_short | Analysing potential side-channel leakage on an embedded device |
| title_sort | analysing potential side channel leakage on an embedded device |
| topic | Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Computer hardware, software and systems |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/167630 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT laulihao analysingpotentialsidechannelleakageonanembeddeddevice |