| Summary: | DC microgrid has attracted a lot of attention in recent years due to its ability
to integrate various renewable energy sources. However, since DC microgrids
usually rely on communication between each distributed generator (DGs) in
implementation, it is vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as DoS and FDI. In this
dissertation, a distributed resilient control algorithm that enables DC microgrids to
cope with both DoS and FDI attacks is put forward. Initially, the advantages of
multiple-bus DC microgrids are compared with AC microgrids, and single-bus
microgrids are analyzed. Next, the hierarchical control architectures of microgrids
are discussed. After this, a physical model of islanded DC microgrids in the case
of no attack is constructed.
Subsequently, a DoS attack model is constructed with assumptions about
attack duration and frequency. A distributed resilient control algorithm, which can
be applied to each distributed generator separately, is designed to resist DoS
attacks on the communication links between DGs. Then FDI attacks are modeled
with the amplitude-bounded unknown function caused by the attacks. To
compensate for the effects of FDI on DC MGs, an intermediate observer is
included in the distributed controller. Afterward, the second method of Lyapunov
is used to prove that the DC MGs under DoS and FDI attacks with the proposed
control method can realize power sharing and global voltage restoration. Then
appropriate controller parameters are selected through rigorous theoretical
analysis.
Finally, case studies based on Simulink show that the control strategy can
make DC MGs resist DoS attacks and FDI attacks simultaneously.
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