| Summary: | This study aims to further examine the averages and limits of an adult’s ability to recursively mindread: that is, the ability to embed and process mental states in other mental states. While first-level mindreading, also known as Theory of Mind, has been the subject of extensive research in the literature, relatively little has been studied about higher-level mindreading, which is arguably essential for communicative practices important to human socialisation, especially in larger communities. Recent research has suggested that the previously understood limit of five levels of recursion were a result of flawed methodology rather than an accurate representation of the processing limits of mental embedding; current understanding points to upwards of seven levels of embedding that an adult can accurately represent in their cognition. Additionally, a significant majority of this research was conducted on Western populations, who speak markedly different varieties of English than those spoken among Outer Circle English speaking countries, such as those spoken in Asia. Last but not least, little is understood about the linguistic and social factors that might affect the limits of recursive mindreading in different populations, if at all – previous research featured little more than exploratory demographic analysis. Thus, the present study aims to: (i) replicate these tests on recursive mindreading, accounting for methodological flaws recently highlighted in the literature, (ii) replicate these tests in an Eastern, English-speaking population, (iii) explore whether one’s vocabulary size of mentalising verbs demonstrate a correlational relationship with limits of recursive mindreading, and (iv) examine whether the ability to embed mental states versus non-mental states differs within individuals.
Keywords: recursive mindreading, mindreading, Theory of Mind, social memory, mental representation, metarepresentation, mental state embedding
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