Incentive mechanism design for mitigating frontrunning and transaction reordering in decentralized exchanges
Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) provide effective price discovery and fair trading while dealing with the drawbacks of centralized exchanges, e.g., lack of transaction transparency and exclusive control of user assets and transaction fees. However, many DEXes suffer from frontrunning and transaction...
Main Authors: | Doe, Daniel Mawunyo, Li, Jing, Dusit, Niyato, Wang, Li, Han, Zhu |
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Andre forfattere: | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
Format: | Journal Article |
Sprog: | English |
Udgivet: |
2023
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Fag: | |
Online adgang: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/169633 |
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