Secured asynchronous-logic cryptography circuits to countermeasure against side-channel attack
This thesis pertains to the investigation of asynchronous-logic design techniques as a countermeasure against the side-channel attack (SCA), i.e., an attack that exploits the secret key of cryptographic devices by analyzing their physical leakage information (e.g., power and electromagnetic). The go...
Main Author: | Ng, Jun Sheng |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Gwee Bah Hwee |
Format: | Thesis-Doctor of Philosophy |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Nanyang Technological University
2024
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/177498 |
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