Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations
In collective decisions, cheating benefits may be independent of others' choices, while the harm to recipients depends on the group outcome, or both benefit and damage rely on the collective outcome. We explored how individuals act in these scenarios through a lab experiment where three partici...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Andre forfattere: | |
| Format: | Conference Paper |
| Sprog: | English |
| Udgivet: |
2024
|
| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/178482 https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/cimeo/summer-schools/soleto-2024 |
| _version_ | 1826130589863903232 |
|---|---|
| author | Riyanto, Yohanes Eko Wang, Yuxin |
| author2 | Interdisciplinary Graduate School (IGS) |
| author_facet | Interdisciplinary Graduate School (IGS) Riyanto, Yohanes Eko Wang, Yuxin |
| author_sort | Riyanto, Yohanes Eko |
| collection | NTU |
| description | In collective decisions, cheating benefits may be independent of others' choices, while the harm to recipients depends on the group outcome, or both benefit and damage rely on the collective outcome. We explored how individuals act in these scenarios through a lab experiment where three participants sequentially reported a coin toss outcome, affecting passive recipients based on the majority's dishonesty. Our findings indicate that when both the harm and benefits depend on the group's outcome, participants strategically choose their responses. They are honest when their deception cannot change the group's decision but more likely to cheat for a higher collective benefit. However, when their gain is tied only to their own actions, hiding their intent to cheat is futile, leading to consistent cheating behavior regardless of its impact on the group. Interestingly, participants were more hesitant to cheat if it harmed just one person, but only when their benefits were not tied to the group outcome. This study sheds light on the complex dynamics of cheating in group settings and the moral calculations behind individuals' choices. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:58:50Z |
| format | Conference Paper |
| id | ntu-10356/178482 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:58:50Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1784822024-06-30T15:37:40Z Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations Riyanto, Yohanes Eko Wang, Yuxin Interdisciplinary Graduate School (IGS) School of Social Sciences SOLETO 2024 - Summer School and Workshop on Experimetrics & Behavioral Economics, 2nd edition Institute of Catastrophe Risk Management (ICRM) Social Sciences Group decisions Laboratory experiment Lying In collective decisions, cheating benefits may be independent of others' choices, while the harm to recipients depends on the group outcome, or both benefit and damage rely on the collective outcome. We explored how individuals act in these scenarios through a lab experiment where three participants sequentially reported a coin toss outcome, affecting passive recipients based on the majority's dishonesty. Our findings indicate that when both the harm and benefits depend on the group's outcome, participants strategically choose their responses. They are honest when their deception cannot change the group's decision but more likely to cheat for a higher collective benefit. However, when their gain is tied only to their own actions, hiding their intent to cheat is futile, leading to consistent cheating behavior regardless of its impact on the group. Interestingly, participants were more hesitant to cheat if it harmed just one person, but only when their benefits were not tied to the group outcome. This study sheds light on the complex dynamics of cheating in group settings and the moral calculations behind individuals' choices. 2024-06-24T06:52:34Z 2024-06-24T06:52:34Z 2024 Conference Paper Riyanto, Y. E. & Wang, Y. (2024). Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations. SOLETO 2024 - Summer School and Workshop on Experimetrics & Behavioral Economics, 2nd edition. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/178482 https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/cimeo/summer-schools/soleto-2024 en © 2024 The Author(s). All rights reserved. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Group decisions Laboratory experiment Lying Riyanto, Yohanes Eko Wang, Yuxin Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title | Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title_full | Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title_fullStr | Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title_short | Incentives and impacts: dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| title_sort | incentives and impacts dissecting individual and collective cheating in organizations |
| topic | Social Sciences Group decisions Laboratory experiment Lying |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/178482 https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/cimeo/summer-schools/soleto-2024 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT riyantoyohaneseko incentivesandimpactsdissectingindividualandcollectivecheatinginorganizations AT wangyuxin incentivesandimpactsdissectingindividualandcollectivecheatinginorganizations |