| Summary: | My dissertation explores Xuanzang's synthesis of the Indian Yogacara view in Cheng Weishi
Lun (成唯識論). This dissertation has three major parts. In the first part (Chapters 1 and 2),
I analyse Xuanzang's arguments against independent entities and an enduring self, with
special attention to how they would constrain the Buddhist account of the continuity of
conscious experience. In the second part (Chapter 3), I present the development of Buddhist
theory of mind, which leads to Yogacara's positing of eight consciousnesses. In this chapter,
I examine the role that subliminal consciousness plays in motivating Xuanzang to prioritise
the relative truth of subjectivity in order to account for the conundrum that he encounters.
Thirdly (Chapter 4), I focus on Xuanzang’s objection against the annihilationist view
intercepting karmic continuity that arises after re-emergence from cessation meditation. This
project concludes with my reconstruction of Xuanzang's understanding of what
enlightenment means (reality as it is) to him and his suggestion for getting back in touch
with saṃsāra through the bodhisattva path and nondualist view of mere-consciousness
(vijñāptimātratā).
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