The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation
Following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, allegedly by Israel, Iran weighs its response, considering the benefits of delaying retaliation to exploit Israel’s internal political instability while avoiding a strong US military reaction. The strategic calculations also invol...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Commentary |
| Language: | English |
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2024
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/179983 |
| _version_ | 1826111054579499008 |
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| author | Alexander, Kristian P. |
| author2 | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies |
| author_facet | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Alexander, Kristian P. |
| author_sort | Alexander, Kristian P. |
| collection | NTU |
| description | Following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, allegedly by Israel, Iran weighs its response, considering the benefits of delaying retaliation to exploit Israel’s internal political instability while avoiding a strong US military reaction. The strategic calculations also involve Hezbollah’s potential role, influenced by Iranian leadership, and the broader implications for Lebanon, already struggling with severe economic and political crises. This calculated restraint reflects Iran’s aim to avoid further escalating tensions with Israel and the US. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T02:44:21Z |
| format | Commentary |
| id | ntu-10356/179983 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T02:44:21Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1799832024-09-15T15:41:50Z The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation Alexander, Kristian P. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Social Sciences Country and region studies International politics and security Following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, allegedly by Israel, Iran weighs its response, considering the benefits of delaying retaliation to exploit Israel’s internal political instability while avoiding a strong US military reaction. The strategic calculations also involve Hezbollah’s potential role, influenced by Iranian leadership, and the broader implications for Lebanon, already struggling with severe economic and political crises. This calculated restraint reflects Iran’s aim to avoid further escalating tensions with Israel and the US. Published version 2024-09-09T06:34:35Z 2024-09-09T06:34:35Z 2024 Commentary Alexander, K. P. (2024). The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation. RSIS Commentaries, 116-24. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/179983 en RSIS Commentaries, 116-24 Nanyang Technological University application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Country and region studies International politics and security Alexander, Kristian P. The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title | The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title_full | The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title_fullStr | The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title_full_unstemmed | The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title_short | The calculus behind Iran's delayed response to Israeli provocation |
| title_sort | calculus behind iran s delayed response to israeli provocation |
| topic | Social Sciences Country and region studies International politics and security |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/179983 |
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