| Summary: | This thesis aims to make the conceptual analysis of morality more approachable. The conceptual analysis of morality is challenging, partly because the methodology of conceptual analysis itself has been questioned and partly because the ambiguity of morality makes it seemingly indefinable. Consequently, some have argued for eliminating the concept of morality altogether. The first part of this thesis defends the traditional method of conceptual analysis and argues for the necessity of retaining the concept of morality. The second part explores how to conduct the conceptual analysis of morality more effectively. By developing an interest-centred theory of concepts, this thesis argues that the core of a concept lies in the interest it serves. The task of conceptual analysis, therefore, is to uncover the specific interest that each concept addresses. Among the current approaches to the conceptual analysis of morality, moral functionalism and pragmatic genealogy are identified as the more effective and promising methods.
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