All-pay contest : an experimental investigation
This paper experimentally investigates a special class of contests, “all-pay contests” (Siegel 2009), where economic agents are asymmetrically positioned and compete by making irreversible investments. We compare four treatments in a between-subject design, with a simple parameterization of Siegel’s...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/52001 |
| _version_ | 1826121927101513728 |
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| author | Hua, Zhunyou Yang, Siqiang Lin, Feifei |
| author2 | Yohanes Eko Riyanto |
| author_facet | Yohanes Eko Riyanto Hua, Zhunyou Yang, Siqiang Lin, Feifei |
| author_sort | Hua, Zhunyou |
| collection | NTU |
| description | This paper experimentally investigates a special class of contests, “all-pay contests” (Siegel 2009), where economic agents are asymmetrically positioned and compete by making irreversible investments. We compare four treatments in a between-subject design, with a simple parameterization of Siegel’s all-pay contest model, to test the theoretical predictions. We find that, while the treatment effects are consistent with the theoretical prediction, average payoffs are significantly lower, and that Siegel's closed form formula is not fully sufficient to determine players’ equilibrium payoffs. Shape of the cost functions, players’ risk and social preferences, and the dynamic of the contest are the possible areas for further research. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:40:09Z |
| format | Final Year Project (FYP) |
| id | ntu-10356/52001 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:40:09Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/520012019-12-10T11:38:47Z All-pay contest : an experimental investigation Hua, Zhunyou Yang, Siqiang Lin, Feifei Yohanes Eko Riyanto School of Humanities and Social Sciences DRNTU::Social sciences This paper experimentally investigates a special class of contests, “all-pay contests” (Siegel 2009), where economic agents are asymmetrically positioned and compete by making irreversible investments. We compare four treatments in a between-subject design, with a simple parameterization of Siegel’s all-pay contest model, to test the theoretical predictions. We find that, while the treatment effects are consistent with the theoretical prediction, average payoffs are significantly lower, and that Siegel's closed form formula is not fully sufficient to determine players’ equilibrium payoffs. Shape of the cost functions, players’ risk and social preferences, and the dynamic of the contest are the possible areas for further research. Bachelor of Arts 2013-04-19T03:38:24Z 2013-04-19T03:38:24Z 2013 2013 Final Year Project (FYP) http://hdl.handle.net/10356/52001 en Nanyang Technological University 45 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Social sciences Hua, Zhunyou Yang, Siqiang Lin, Feifei All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title | All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title_full | All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title_fullStr | All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title_full_unstemmed | All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title_short | All-pay contest : an experimental investigation |
| title_sort | all pay contest an experimental investigation |
| topic | DRNTU::Social sciences |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/52001 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT huazhunyou allpaycontestanexperimentalinvestigation AT yangsiqiang allpaycontestanexperimentalinvestigation AT linfeifei allpaycontestanexperimentalinvestigation |