Incentive compatible design of reverse auctions.

Incentive compatible design of reverse auctions.

We consider two classes of optimization problems that emerge in the set up of the reverse auctions (a.k.a. procurement auctions). Unlike the standard optimization taking place for a commonly known input, we assume that every individual submits his piece of the input and may misreport his data or not...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gravin, Nikolai.
Other Authors: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Format: Research Report
Language:English
Published: 2013
Subjects:
DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Theory of computation
DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Applied mathematics::Game theory
DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Discrete mathematics::Graph theory
DRNTU::Science::Mathematics::Applied mathematics::Optimization
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10356/54944

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/10356/54944

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