Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat
The Taliban insurgency in Swat which started apparently as a social movement in 2004 transformed into an anti-Pakistan Islamist insurgency by joining hands with the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) upon its formation in 2007. It quickly spread beyond Swat by 2009 making Swat the second stronghold o...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2013
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/55181 |
| _version_ | 1826112285460922368 |
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| author | Ali Arshad |
| author2 | Arabinda Acharya |
| author_facet | Arabinda Acharya Ali Arshad |
| author_sort | Ali Arshad |
| collection | NTU |
| description | The Taliban insurgency in Swat which started apparently as a social movement in 2004 transformed into an anti-Pakistan Islamist insurgency by joining hands with the Tehrik-eTaliban
Pakistan (TTP) upon its formation in 2007. It quickly spread beyond Swat by 2009 making Swat the second stronghold of TTP after FATA. It prompted the Pakistan military to launch a full-scale counterinsurgency military operation code named Rah-iRast to regain the control of Swat. Operation Rah-i-Rast was successful not only in restoring the writ of the State but more importantly in creating a consensus against the spread of Taliban insurgency in Pakistan at political, social and military levels. This operation became a test case for civilian
government and military to seek for a sustainable solution combating the TTP insurgency in the north-west of Pakistan..
This study analyzes why the counterinsurgency operation Rah-i-Rast was successful and why the previous ones came into failure. The study also explores factors which created consensus against the Taliban insurgency at political and social level as well as reasons which hindered such a consensual approach in the past. The study argues that the
previous initiatives failed due to various factors including Pakistan army's lack of comprehensive counterinsurgency model, weak political will and public support, and
states negligence. Also, the initial counterinsurgency policies were ad-hoc in nature fluctuating between military operations and peace deals. After continuous failure, the military revisited its approach to counterinsurgency in the operation Rah-i-Rast. The security forces learnt from their past experiences and
developed a pragmatic counterinsurgency model: 'clear, hold, build, and transfer.' The military also adopted the population-centric approach to provide security to the local people. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:04:29Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | ntu-10356/55181 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:04:29Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/551812020-11-01T08:10:49Z Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat Ali Arshad Arabinda Acharya S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies DRNTU::Humanities The Taliban insurgency in Swat which started apparently as a social movement in 2004 transformed into an anti-Pakistan Islamist insurgency by joining hands with the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) upon its formation in 2007. It quickly spread beyond Swat by 2009 making Swat the second stronghold of TTP after FATA. It prompted the Pakistan military to launch a full-scale counterinsurgency military operation code named Rah-iRast to regain the control of Swat. Operation Rah-i-Rast was successful not only in restoring the writ of the State but more importantly in creating a consensus against the spread of Taliban insurgency in Pakistan at political, social and military levels. This operation became a test case for civilian government and military to seek for a sustainable solution combating the TTP insurgency in the north-west of Pakistan.. This study analyzes why the counterinsurgency operation Rah-i-Rast was successful and why the previous ones came into failure. The study also explores factors which created consensus against the Taliban insurgency at political and social level as well as reasons which hindered such a consensual approach in the past. The study argues that the previous initiatives failed due to various factors including Pakistan army's lack of comprehensive counterinsurgency model, weak political will and public support, and states negligence. Also, the initial counterinsurgency policies were ad-hoc in nature fluctuating between military operations and peace deals. After continuous failure, the military revisited its approach to counterinsurgency in the operation Rah-i-Rast. The security forces learnt from their past experiences and developed a pragmatic counterinsurgency model: 'clear, hold, build, and transfer.' The military also adopted the population-centric approach to provide security to the local people. Master of Science (Strategic Studies) 2013-12-30T01:04:05Z 2013-12-30T01:04:05Z 2013 2013 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/10356/55181 en 65 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Humanities Ali Arshad Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title | Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title_full | Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title_fullStr | Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title_short | Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations : a case study of swat |
| title_sort | pakistan s counterinsurgency operations a case study of swat |
| topic | DRNTU::Humanities |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/55181 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT aliarshad pakistanscounterinsurgencyoperationsacasestudyofswat |