| Summary: | The goal of my paper is show that we should abandon the treatment/enhancement
distinction in favour of a particularist approach when evaluating the ethics of non-clinical uses
of psychiatric drugs because there is no principled way to draw the distinction between
treatment and enhancement. To meet my paper’s objective: I will first introduce the
significance of the treatment/enhancement distinction in influencing healthcare policies. In
section two, I give reasons for why I think that if there was an objective way to capture the idea
of normal functioning, the statistical approach would be the best candidate. Next, in section
three, I will argue that both Tyrer and Steinberg’s and Boorse’s statistical approaches are
inadequate in giving us a defensible conception of normal functioning. In light of this, I propose
in the fourth and final section, that we should consider the particularist approach over the
generalist approach.
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