Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view

Desire satisfactionism states that a person’s well-being increases when one’s desires are satisfied, where one’s desires are satisfied if the desired object obtains. A person can have a desire at a certain point of time but the desired object may only obtain at another time where the person lacks th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong
Other Authors: Andrew T. Forcehimes
Format: Final Year Project (FYP)
Language:English
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10356/76519
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author Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong
author2 Andrew T. Forcehimes
author_facet Andrew T. Forcehimes
Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong
author_sort Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong
collection NTU
description Desire satisfactionism states that a person’s well-being increases when one’s desires are satisfied, where one’s desires are satisfied if the desired object obtains. A person can have a desire at a certain point of time but the desired object may only obtain at another time where the person lacks the desire. This raises two questions. First, does a person benefit when the desire and the desired object do not temporally overlap? Second, at what time, if any, does a person benefit in such cases? This paper advances a new view called No-Future Time of Desire. This view says that a person does not benefit if the desired object obtains after the desire, though a person can benefit if the desired object obtains prior to the desire. In such cases, a person benefits at the time they have the desire. I argue that this view is superior to other current views such as Time of Desire, Time of Object, Asymmetrism, Fusion and Concurrentism.
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spelling ntu-10356/765192019-12-10T12:08:02Z Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong Andrew T. Forcehimes School of Humanities DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy Desire satisfactionism states that a person’s well-being increases when one’s desires are satisfied, where one’s desires are satisfied if the desired object obtains. A person can have a desire at a certain point of time but the desired object may only obtain at another time where the person lacks the desire. This raises two questions. First, does a person benefit when the desire and the desired object do not temporally overlap? Second, at what time, if any, does a person benefit in such cases? This paper advances a new view called No-Future Time of Desire. This view says that a person does not benefit if the desired object obtains after the desire, though a person can benefit if the desired object obtains prior to the desire. In such cases, a person benefits at the time they have the desire. I argue that this view is superior to other current views such as Time of Desire, Time of Object, Asymmetrism, Fusion and Concurrentism. Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 2019-03-25T07:52:56Z 2019-03-25T07:52:56Z 2019 Final Year Project (FYP) http://hdl.handle.net/10356/76519 en Nanyang Technological University 33 p. application/pdf
spellingShingle DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy
Choo, Frederick Wen Yeong
Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title_full Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title_fullStr Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title_full_unstemmed Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title_short Desire-satisfactionism and the no-future time of desire view
title_sort desire satisfactionism and the no future time of desire view
topic DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy
url http://hdl.handle.net/10356/76519
work_keys_str_mv AT choofrederickwenyeong desiresatisfactionismandthenofuturetimeofdesireview