Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation : evidence from job-hopping
We find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-...
Hlavní autoři: | Gao, Huasheng, Luo, Juan, Tang, Tilan |
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Další autoři: | Nanyang Business School |
Médium: | Journal Article |
Jazyk: | English |
Vydáno: |
2015
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Témata: | |
On-line přístup: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79450 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25371 |
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