What determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms? Evidence from investment management firms
We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with bo...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79527 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25039 |
| Summary: | We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with both executive and operational responsibilities; when benefits of cooperation are higher; and with large contributions to firm value. Consistent with career concerns, we find increases in a manager's ownership are associated with increases in unsystematic risk. Ownership dispersion within the firm is associated with the allocation of monitoring and operational roles and the potential benefits of cooperation. |
|---|