A comparison of CEO pay–performance sensitivity in privately-held and public firms
In this paper we study CEO contract design employing a unique dataset on privately-held and public firm CEO annual compensation over the period 1999–2011. We first show that CEOs in public firms are paid 30% more than CEOs in comparable privately-held firms. We further show that both private and pub...
Main Authors: | Gao, Huasheng, Li, Kai |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/81582 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/39554 |
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