Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism
This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that...
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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2016
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116 |
| _version_ | 1811690827421843456 |
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| author | Chen, Melvin |
| author2 | School of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| author_facet | School of Humanities and Social Sciences Chen, Melvin |
| author_sort | Chen, Melvin |
| collection | NTU |
| description | This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of proof, stops the regress of causes, finds a buck-stopper in the form of a self who can be held morally responsible for a choice or an action, and avoids committing the Strawsonian fallacy of circular reasoning by not setting impossible demands on moral responsibility. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:10:11Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/82141 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:10:11Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/821412020-03-07T12:10:37Z Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism Chen, Melvin School of Humanities and Social Sciences Semi-compatibilism Metaethics This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of proof, stops the regress of causes, finds a buck-stopper in the form of a self who can be held morally responsible for a choice or an action, and avoids committing the Strawsonian fallacy of circular reasoning by not setting impossible demands on moral responsibility. 2016-08-10T05:59:01Z 2019-12-06T14:47:30Z 2016-08-10T05:59:01Z 2019-12-06T14:47:30Z 2014 Journal Article Chen, M. (2014). Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism. The Philosophical Forum, 45(1), 1-15. 0031-806X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116 10.1111/phil.12024 en The Philosophical Forum © 2014 The Philosophical Forum, Inc. |
| spellingShingle | Semi-compatibilism Metaethics Chen, Melvin Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title | Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title_full | Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title_fullStr | Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title_short | Strawson contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism |
| title_sort | strawson contra strawson moral responsibility and semi compatibilism |
| topic | Semi-compatibilism Metaethics |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/82141 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41116 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chenmelvin strawsoncontrastrawsonmoralresponsibilityandsemicompatibilism |