Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings
Automating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studied as bilateral bargaining problems, while one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are studied as auctioning problems. Th...
| Huvudupphovsmän: | , , |
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| Materialtyp: | Journal Article |
| Språk: | English |
| Publicerad: |
2016
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| Länkar: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/84602 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41875 |
| _version_ | 1826125551636578304 |
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| author | An, Bo Gatti, Nicola Lesser, Victor |
| author2 | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
| author_facet | School of Computer Science and Engineering An, Bo Gatti, Nicola Lesser, Victor |
| author_sort | An, Bo |
| collection | NTU |
| description | Automating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studied as bilateral bargaining problems, while one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are studied as auctioning problems. This paper aims at bridging together these two approaches, analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations when agents follow the alternating-offers bargaining protocol (Rubinstein Econometrica 50(1), 97–109, 33). First, we extend this protocol, proposing a novel mechanism that captures the peculiarities of these settings. Then, we analyze agents’ equilibrium strategies in complete information bargaining and we find that for a large subset of the space of the parameters, the equilibrium outcome depends on the values of a narrow number of parameters. Finally, we study incomplete information bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices and we provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:38:30Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/84602 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:38:30Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/846022020-03-07T11:48:57Z Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings An, Bo Gatti, Nicola Lesser, Victor School of Computer Science and Engineering Automated negotiation Equilibrium strategy Automating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studied as bilateral bargaining problems, while one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are studied as auctioning problems. This paper aims at bridging together these two approaches, analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations when agents follow the alternating-offers bargaining protocol (Rubinstein Econometrica 50(1), 97–109, 33). First, we extend this protocol, proposing a novel mechanism that captures the peculiarities of these settings. Then, we analyze agents’ equilibrium strategies in complete information bargaining and we find that for a large subset of the space of the parameters, the equilibrium outcome depends on the values of a narrow number of parameters. Finally, we study incomplete information bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices and we provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. Accepted version 2016-12-16T08:13:51Z 2019-12-06T15:48:07Z 2016-12-16T08:13:51Z 2019-12-06T15:48:07Z 2016 Journal Article An, B., Gatti, N., & Lesser, V. (2016). Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 77(1), 67-103. 1012-2443 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/84602 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41875 10.1007/s10472-016-9506-x en Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence © 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, Springer International Publishing Switzerland. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-016-9506-x]. 38 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Automated negotiation Equilibrium strategy An, Bo Gatti, Nicola Lesser, Victor Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title | Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title_full | Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title_fullStr | Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title_full_unstemmed | Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title_short | Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings |
| title_sort | alternating offers bargaining in one to many and many to many settings |
| topic | Automated negotiation Equilibrium strategy |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/84602 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41875 |
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