A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks

Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent....

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Main Authors: Breier, Jakub, Jap, Dirmanto, Bhasin, Shivam
Other Authors: School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735
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author Breier, Jakub
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
author2 School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
author_facet School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences
Breier, Jakub
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
author_sort Breier, Jakub
collection NTU
description Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent. This property comes from the data redundancy that is being employed in order to equalize the leakage. In this work, we analyze three different software encoding schemes with respect to fault injection attacks. We use a custom-made code analyzer to check the vulnerabilities in the assembly code, and we experimentally support our results using laser fault injection technique. Our results show that implementations based on table lookup operations provide reasonable security margin and thwart fault propagation.
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spelling ntu-10356/887692020-09-26T22:18:38Z A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks Breier, Jakub Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Temasek Laboratories Fault Attacks Software Countermeasures Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent. This property comes from the data redundancy that is being employed in order to equalize the leakage. In this work, we analyze three different software encoding schemes with respect to fault injection attacks. We use a custom-made code analyzer to check the vulnerabilities in the assembly code, and we experimentally support our results using laser fault injection technique. Our results show that implementations based on table lookup operations provide reasonable security margin and thwart fault propagation. Accepted version 2018-05-03T02:52:39Z 2019-12-06T17:10:34Z 2018-05-03T02:52:39Z 2019-12-06T17:10:34Z 2018 2017 Journal Article Breier, J., Jap, D., & Bhasin, S. (2017). A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 7(4), 311–320. 2190-8508 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735 10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5 206720 en Journal of Cryptographic Engineering © 2017 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5]. 10 p. application/pdf
spellingShingle Fault Attacks
Software Countermeasures
Breier, Jakub
Jap, Dirmanto
Bhasin, Shivam
A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title_full A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title_fullStr A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title_full_unstemmed A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title_short A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
title_sort study on analyzing side channel resistant encoding schemes with respect to fault attacks
topic Fault Attacks
Software Countermeasures
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735
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