A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks
Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent....
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Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
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2018
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735 |
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author | Breier, Jakub Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam |
author2 | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
author_facet | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Breier, Jakub Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam |
author_sort | Breier, Jakub |
collection | NTU |
description | Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent. This property comes from the data redundancy that is being employed in order to equalize the leakage. In this work, we analyze three different software encoding schemes with respect to fault injection attacks. We use a custom-made code analyzer to check the vulnerabilities in the assembly code, and we experimentally support our results using laser fault injection technique. Our results show that implementations based on table lookup operations provide reasonable security margin and thwart fault propagation. |
first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:28:26Z |
format | Journal Article |
id | ntu-10356/88769 |
institution | Nanyang Technological University |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:28:26Z |
publishDate | 2018 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | ntu-10356/887692020-09-26T22:18:38Z A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks Breier, Jakub Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Temasek Laboratories Fault Attacks Software Countermeasures Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent. This property comes from the data redundancy that is being employed in order to equalize the leakage. In this work, we analyze three different software encoding schemes with respect to fault injection attacks. We use a custom-made code analyzer to check the vulnerabilities in the assembly code, and we experimentally support our results using laser fault injection technique. Our results show that implementations based on table lookup operations provide reasonable security margin and thwart fault propagation. Accepted version 2018-05-03T02:52:39Z 2019-12-06T17:10:34Z 2018-05-03T02:52:39Z 2019-12-06T17:10:34Z 2018 2017 Journal Article Breier, J., Jap, D., & Bhasin, S. (2017). A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 7(4), 311–320. 2190-8508 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735 10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5 206720 en Journal of Cryptographic Engineering © 2017 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5]. 10 p. application/pdf |
spellingShingle | Fault Attacks Software Countermeasures Breier, Jakub Jap, Dirmanto Bhasin, Shivam A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title | A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title_full | A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title_fullStr | A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title_full_unstemmed | A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title_short | A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks |
title_sort | study on analyzing side channel resistant encoding schemes with respect to fault attacks |
topic | Fault Attacks Software Countermeasures |
url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44735 |
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