The cost of stability in coalitional games
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In t...
Main Authors: | Bachrach, Yoram, Elkind, Edith, Meir, Reshef, Zuckerman, Michael, Rothe, Jӧrg, Pasechnik, Dmitrii V., Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
Format: | Conference Paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94109 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7628 |
Similar Items
-
The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games
by: Bachrach, Y, et al.
Published: (2009) -
Bounds on the cost of stabilizing a cooperative game
by: Bachrach, Y, et al.
Published: (2018) -
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
by: Pasechnik, Dmitrii V., et al.
Published: (2011) -
Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks
by: Meir, R, et al.
Published: (2013) -
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
by: Zuckerman, Michael, et al.
Published: (2013)