Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE
A provably secure countermeasure against first order side-channel attacks was proposed by Nikova et al. (P. Ning, S. Qing, N. Li (eds.) International conference in information and communications security. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 4307, pp. 529–545, Springer, Berlin, 2006). We have imp...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
2012
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| Acceso en liña: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94926 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7712 |
| _version_ | 1826118242339389440 |
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| author | Poschmann, Axel Moradi, Amir Khoo, Khoongming Lim, Chu Wee Wang, Huaxiong Ling, San |
| author2 | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
| author_facet | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Poschmann, Axel Moradi, Amir Khoo, Khoongming Lim, Chu Wee Wang, Huaxiong Ling, San |
| author_sort | Poschmann, Axel |
| collection | NTU |
| description | A provably secure countermeasure against first order side-channel attacks was proposed by Nikova et al. (P. Ning, S. Qing, N. Li (eds.) International conference in information and communications security. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 4307, pp. 529–545, Springer, Berlin, 2006). We have implemented the lightweight block cipher PRESENT using the proposed countermeasure. For this purpose we had to decompose the S-box used in PRESENT and split it into three shares that fulfill the properties of the scheme presented by Nikova et al. (P. Lee, J. Cheon (eds.) International conference in information security and cryptology. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 5461, pp. 218–234, Springer, Berlin, 2008). Our experimental results on real-world power traces show that this countermeasure provides additional security. Post-synthesis figures for an ASIC implementation require only 2,300 GE, which makes this implementation suitable for low-cost passive RFID-tags. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T04:40:30Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/94926 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T04:40:30Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/949262023-02-28T19:38:32Z Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE Poschmann, Axel Moradi, Amir Khoo, Khoongming Lim, Chu Wee Wang, Huaxiong Ling, San School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences DRNTU::Science::Mathematics A provably secure countermeasure against first order side-channel attacks was proposed by Nikova et al. (P. Ning, S. Qing, N. Li (eds.) International conference in information and communications security. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 4307, pp. 529–545, Springer, Berlin, 2006). We have implemented the lightweight block cipher PRESENT using the proposed countermeasure. For this purpose we had to decompose the S-box used in PRESENT and split it into three shares that fulfill the properties of the scheme presented by Nikova et al. (P. Lee, J. Cheon (eds.) International conference in information security and cryptology. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 5461, pp. 218–234, Springer, Berlin, 2008). Our experimental results on real-world power traces show that this countermeasure provides additional security. Post-synthesis figures for an ASIC implementation require only 2,300 GE, which makes this implementation suitable for low-cost passive RFID-tags. Accepted version 2012-04-11T01:35:35Z 2019-12-06T19:04:50Z 2012-04-11T01:35:35Z 2019-12-06T19:04:50Z 2010 2010 Journal Article Poschmann, A., Moradi, A., Khoo, K., Lim, C. W., Wang, H., & Ling, S. (2010). Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE. Journal of Cryptology, 24(2), 322-345. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94926 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7712 10.1007/s00145-010-9086-6 en Journal of cryptology © 2010 International Association for Cryptologic Research. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Cryptology, Springer on behalf of International Association for Cryptologic Research. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-010-9086-6 24 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Science::Mathematics Poschmann, Axel Moradi, Amir Khoo, Khoongming Lim, Chu Wee Wang, Huaxiong Ling, San Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title | Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title_full | Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title_fullStr | Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title_full_unstemmed | Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title_short | Side-channel resistant crypto for less than 2,300 GE |
| title_sort | side channel resistant crypto for less than 2 300 ge |
| topic | DRNTU::Science::Mathematics |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94926 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7712 |
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