Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation

Philosophers, following Kripke, have formulated their notions of rigid designation in two ways. One way focuses on objects and defines a rigid designator as "referring to the object in every possible world in which the object exists" (I will call it 'the first defination').1 The...

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Main Author: Li, Chenyang
Other Authors: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96396
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/9856
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author Li, Chenyang
author2 School of Humanities and Social Sciences
author_facet School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Li, Chenyang
author_sort Li, Chenyang
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description Philosophers, following Kripke, have formulated their notions of rigid designation in two ways. One way focuses on objects and defines a rigid designator as "referring to the object in every possible world in which the object exists" (I will call it 'the first defination').1 The other way focuses on designators and defines a rigid designator as "referring to the same object in every possible world in which the designator refers at all" (I will call it 'the second definition').2 The difference between these two definitions has not gone unnoticed, but to my knowledge the origin of the second definition and the consequences of the inconsistency between these two co-existing definitions have not been carefully explored.3 I shall show that Kripke in Naming and Necessity is accountable for both definitions and he would have to make a hard choice to maintain consistency.
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spelling ntu-10356/963962019-12-06T19:29:57Z Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation Li, Chenyang School of Humanities and Social Sciences DRNTU::Social sciences::Psychology::Ethics Philosophers, following Kripke, have formulated their notions of rigid designation in two ways. One way focuses on objects and defines a rigid designator as "referring to the object in every possible world in which the object exists" (I will call it 'the first defination').1 The other way focuses on designators and defines a rigid designator as "referring to the same object in every possible world in which the designator refers at all" (I will call it 'the second definition').2 The difference between these two definitions has not gone unnoticed, but to my knowledge the origin of the second definition and the consequences of the inconsistency between these two co-existing definitions have not been carefully explored.3 I shall show that Kripke in Naming and Necessity is accountable for both definitions and he would have to make a hard choice to maintain consistency. 2013-04-23T07:50:39Z 2019-12-06T19:29:57Z 2013-04-23T07:50:39Z 2019-12-06T19:29:57Z 1992 1992 Journal Article Li, C. (1992). Kripke's Two Definitions of Rigid Designation. The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 63-71. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96396 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/9856 170905 en The Jerusalem philosophical quarterly © 1992 Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 41.
spellingShingle DRNTU::Social sciences::Psychology::Ethics
Li, Chenyang
Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title_full Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title_fullStr Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title_full_unstemmed Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title_short Kripke's two definitions of rigid designation
title_sort kripke s two definitions of rigid designation
topic DRNTU::Social sciences::Psychology::Ethics
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/96396
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/9856
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