Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corpo...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083 |
| _version_ | 1811685125851709440 |
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| author | Bae, Kee-Hong Baek, Jae-Seung Kang, Jun-Koo Liu, Wei-Lin |
| author2 | Nanyang Business School |
| author_facet | Nanyang Business School Bae, Kee-Hong Baek, Jae-Seung Kang, Jun-Koo Liu, Wei-Lin |
| author_sort | Bae, Kee-Hong |
| collection | NTU |
| description | We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T04:39:33Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/97936 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T04:39:33Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/979362023-05-19T06:44:41Z Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence Bae, Kee-Hong Baek, Jae-Seung Kang, Jun-Koo Liu, Wei-Lin Nanyang Business School DRNTU::Business::Finance We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value. 2013-12-05T03:43:05Z 2019-12-06T19:48:32Z 2013-12-05T03:43:05Z 2019-12-06T19:48:32Z 2012 2012 Journal Article Bae, K.-H., Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., & Liu, W.-L. (2012). Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. Journal of financial economics, 105(2), 412-435. 0304-405X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.02.007 en Journal of financial economics |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Business::Finance Bae, Kee-Hong Baek, Jae-Seung Kang, Jun-Koo Liu, Wei-Lin Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title | Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title_full | Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title_fullStr | Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title_short | Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence |
| title_sort | do controlling shareholders expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value theory and evidence |
| topic | DRNTU::Business::Finance |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083 |
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