Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms
We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H share...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97970 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12250 |
| _version_ | 1826127276300828672 |
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| author | Ke, Bin Rui, Oliver Yu, Wei |
| author2 | Nanyang Business School |
| author_facet | Nanyang Business School Ke, Bin Rui, Oliver Yu, Wei |
| author_sort | Ke, Bin |
| collection | NTU |
| description | We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H shares (firms incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong), and Red Chip shares (firms incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong). We find no difference in the three pay-for-performance sensitivity measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm types. However, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is insignificant for all three firm types. Our study illustrates the complexity in the influence of mainland China’s versus Hong Kong’s institutional forces on state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:06:14Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/97970 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:06:14Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/979702023-05-19T06:44:41Z Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms Ke, Bin Rui, Oliver Yu, Wei Nanyang Business School We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H shares (firms incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong), and Red Chip shares (firms incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong). We find no difference in the three pay-for-performance sensitivity measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm types. However, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is insignificant for all three firm types. Our study illustrates the complexity in the influence of mainland China’s versus Hong Kong’s institutional forces on state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong. 2013-07-25T06:43:59Z 2019-12-06T19:48:55Z 2013-07-25T06:43:59Z 2019-12-06T19:48:55Z 2012 2012 Journal Article Ke, B., Rui, O., & Yu, W. (2012). Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled Chinese firms. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(1), 166-188. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97970 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12250 10.1007/s11142-011-9169-0 en Review of accounting studies © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. |
| spellingShingle | Ke, Bin Rui, Oliver Yu, Wei Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title | Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title_full | Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title_fullStr | Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title_short | Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled chinese firms |
| title_sort | hong kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state controlled chinese firms |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97970 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12250 |
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