MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the...
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Format: | Thesis |
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[Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada
2013
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author | , FAISAL , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA |
author_facet | , FAISAL , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA |
author_sort | , FAISAL |
collection | UGM |
description | A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in
Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders.
This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests
the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the ownership concentration
of majority shareholders and firm value. This study employs 456 firm-year
observations of non-financial companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from
2001 to 2010 as a sample of overall companies, and 263 firm-year observations as a
sample group of firms that have low investment opportunities and high free cash
flows. This research utilizes the piecewise regression model to find entrechment or
expropriation effect by majority shareholders. Furthermore, the interaction regression
model or the hierarchical regression model are used to test the control mechanisms
for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders through
ownership concentration of blockholders, independent second largest blockholders,
debt policy, dividend policy, and the ownership types of majority shareholders (i.e.,
foreign versus domestic, market investors versus stable investors or inside investors,
and government).
Using the piecewise regression model with Estimated Generalized Least
Squares (EGLS), I find that the behavior of shareholders is not consistent, with the
expropriation effect by majority shareholders being at the ownership level above 70%
for the first sample group and 60% for the second. Using the interaction regression
model or the hierarchical regression model with EGLS, I also find that debt policy,
foreign ownership, market investors, and government are moderating variables,
whereas independent second largest blockholders is a predictor variable, functioning
as the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority
shareholders in Indonesia. Furthermore, devidend policy is considered a control
mechanism for management, but not effective as a control mechanism for the agency
conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Eventually, this
study substantiates the agency theory especially the second type, the free cash flows
agency theory, the partial benefits of corporate control theory, and the rent extraction
hypothesis. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-13T22:54:03Z |
format | Thesis |
id | oai:generic.eprints.org:120836 |
institution | Universiti Gadjah Mada |
last_indexed | 2024-03-13T22:54:03Z |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oai:generic.eprints.org:1208362016-03-04T08:35:01Z https://repository.ugm.ac.id/120836/ MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA , FAISAL , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA ETD A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the ownership concentration of majority shareholders and firm value. This study employs 456 firm-year observations of non-financial companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2010 as a sample of overall companies, and 263 firm-year observations as a sample group of firms that have low investment opportunities and high free cash flows. This research utilizes the piecewise regression model to find entrechment or expropriation effect by majority shareholders. Furthermore, the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model are used to test the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders through ownership concentration of blockholders, independent second largest blockholders, debt policy, dividend policy, and the ownership types of majority shareholders (i.e., foreign versus domestic, market investors versus stable investors or inside investors, and government). Using the piecewise regression model with Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS), I find that the behavior of shareholders is not consistent, with the expropriation effect by majority shareholders being at the ownership level above 70% for the first sample group and 60% for the second. Using the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model with EGLS, I also find that debt policy, foreign ownership, market investors, and government are moderating variables, whereas independent second largest blockholders is a predictor variable, functioning as the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Furthermore, devidend policy is considered a control mechanism for management, but not effective as a control mechanism for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Eventually, this study substantiates the agency theory especially the second type, the free cash flows agency theory, the partial benefits of corporate control theory, and the rent extraction hypothesis. [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada 2013 Thesis NonPeerReviewed , FAISAL and , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA (2013) MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA. UNSPECIFIED thesis, UNSPECIFIED. http://etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view&typ=html&buku_id=60874 |
spellingShingle | ETD , FAISAL , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title | MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title_full | MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title_fullStr | MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title_full_unstemmed | MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title_short | MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA |
title_sort | mekanisme pengendalian konflik keagenan antara pemegang saham mayoritas dan minoritas studi empiris di bursa efek indonesia |
topic | ETD |
work_keys_str_mv | AT faisal mekanismepengendaliankonflikkeagenanantarapemegangsahammayoritasdanminoritasstudiempirisdibursaefekindonesia AT profdreduardustandelilinmba mekanismepengendaliankonflikkeagenanantarapemegangsahammayoritasdanminoritasstudiempirisdibursaefekindonesia |