MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA

A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the...

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Main Authors: , FAISAL, , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA
Format: Thesis
Published: [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada 2013
Subjects:
ETD
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author , FAISAL
, Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA
author_facet , FAISAL
, Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA
author_sort , FAISAL
collection UGM
description A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the ownership concentration of majority shareholders and firm value. This study employs 456 firm-year observations of non-financial companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2010 as a sample of overall companies, and 263 firm-year observations as a sample group of firms that have low investment opportunities and high free cash flows. This research utilizes the piecewise regression model to find entrechment or expropriation effect by majority shareholders. Furthermore, the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model are used to test the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders through ownership concentration of blockholders, independent second largest blockholders, debt policy, dividend policy, and the ownership types of majority shareholders (i.e., foreign versus domestic, market investors versus stable investors or inside investors, and government). Using the piecewise regression model with Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS), I find that the behavior of shareholders is not consistent, with the expropriation effect by majority shareholders being at the ownership level above 70% for the first sample group and 60% for the second. Using the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model with EGLS, I also find that debt policy, foreign ownership, market investors, and government are moderating variables, whereas independent second largest blockholders is a predictor variable, functioning as the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Furthermore, devidend policy is considered a control mechanism for management, but not effective as a control mechanism for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Eventually, this study substantiates the agency theory especially the second type, the free cash flows agency theory, the partial benefits of corporate control theory, and the rent extraction hypothesis.
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spelling oai:generic.eprints.org:1208362016-03-04T08:35:01Z https://repository.ugm.ac.id/120836/ MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA , FAISAL , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA ETD A highly concentrated ownership structure in non-financial companies in Indonesia creates an agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This research examines the agency conflicts and their control mechanisms, and tests the sensitivity of ownership types to the relation between the ownership concentration of majority shareholders and firm value. This study employs 456 firm-year observations of non-financial companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2010 as a sample of overall companies, and 263 firm-year observations as a sample group of firms that have low investment opportunities and high free cash flows. This research utilizes the piecewise regression model to find entrechment or expropriation effect by majority shareholders. Furthermore, the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model are used to test the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders through ownership concentration of blockholders, independent second largest blockholders, debt policy, dividend policy, and the ownership types of majority shareholders (i.e., foreign versus domestic, market investors versus stable investors or inside investors, and government). Using the piecewise regression model with Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS), I find that the behavior of shareholders is not consistent, with the expropriation effect by majority shareholders being at the ownership level above 70% for the first sample group and 60% for the second. Using the interaction regression model or the hierarchical regression model with EGLS, I also find that debt policy, foreign ownership, market investors, and government are moderating variables, whereas independent second largest blockholders is a predictor variable, functioning as the control mechanisms for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Furthermore, devidend policy is considered a control mechanism for management, but not effective as a control mechanism for the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in Indonesia. Eventually, this study substantiates the agency theory especially the second type, the free cash flows agency theory, the partial benefits of corporate control theory, and the rent extraction hypothesis. [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada 2013 Thesis NonPeerReviewed , FAISAL and , Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA (2013) MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA. UNSPECIFIED thesis, UNSPECIFIED. http://etd.ugm.ac.id/index.php?mod=penelitian_detail&sub=PenelitianDetail&act=view&typ=html&buku_id=60874
spellingShingle ETD
, FAISAL
, Prof. Dr. Eduardus Tandelilin, MBA
MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title_full MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title_fullStr MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title_full_unstemmed MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title_short MEKANISME PENGENDALIAN KONFLIK KEAGENAN ANTARA PEMEGANG SAHAM MAYORITAS DAN MINORITAS STUDI EMPIRIS DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
title_sort mekanisme pengendalian konflik keagenan antara pemegang saham mayoritas dan minoritas studi empiris di bursa efek indonesia
topic ETD
work_keys_str_mv AT faisal mekanismepengendaliankonflikkeagenanantarapemegangsahammayoritasdanminoritasstudiempirisdibursaefekindonesia
AT profdreduardustandelilinmba mekanismepengendaliankonflikkeagenanantarapemegangsahammayoritasdanminoritasstudiempirisdibursaefekindonesia