PENGARUH KECAKAPAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN DENGAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL SEBAGAI VARIABEL PEMODERASI
The firm's main objective in finance is to increase firm value. The achievement of this objective depends on the characteristics of the manager of the firm. One of the characteristics of a manager is managerial ability. Capable manager will be able to increase the firm value. The existence of c...
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| Format: | Thesis |
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[Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada
2013
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| Summary: | The firm's main objective in finance is to increase firm value. The
achievement of this objective depends on the characteristics of the manager of the
firm. One of the characteristics of a manager is managerial ability. Capable
manager will be able to increase the firm value.
The existence of capable managers is not enough to increase the firm
value. The achievement of increasing value of the firm also depends on how big
the conflict of interest between manager and shareholder. Conflict of interest
between manager and shareholder can be minimized with stock ownership by
manager so that increasing firm value can be achieved.
This study aimed to examine the effect of managerial ability on firm value
with managerial ownership as moderating variable. The samples of this study as
many as 79 firms listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange from year 2008 to 2011.
Managerial ability was measured using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Firm
value was measured using Tobin's Q. Managerial ownership is measured from the
existence ownership of shares by manager.
The results of this study is managerial ability have positive significant
effect on firm value. This result indicate that the more capable a manager, the
more manager run the business effectively and efficiently, and make decisions that
create value for the firm.
Interaction between managerial ability with managerial ownership have
positive significant effect on firm value. Managerial ownership strengthen the
effect of managerial ability on firm value. This result indicate that capable
manager will more increase firm value if the manager have firm stock than
capable manager who does not have firm stock. Managerial ownership can
reduce conflict of interest between manager and shareholder. |
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