Struktur Kepemilikan, Risiko, Dan Kebijakan

ABSTRACT The research explores using simultaneous regression, to examine the interdependence relationship between managerial ownership, risk, dividend policy, insthutional ownership, and leverage policy for Indonesian capital market, The research fries to explain how the relationships in financial p...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Perpustakaan UGM, i-lib
Format: Article
Published: [Yogyakarta] : Universitas Gadjah Mada 2004
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Summary:ABSTRACT The research explores using simultaneous regression, to examine the interdependence relationship between managerial ownership, risk, dividend policy, insthutional ownership, and leverage policy for Indonesian capital market, The research fries to explain how the relationships in financial policy for manufacture firms in Indonesia, We use five models of regression to represent five different policies in firms that reflect the agency issues and conflict of interest between agent (managed. and principal (insider and outsider shareholders). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agency problem arise from separation of ownership and control. Each of five policies in this research is represent conflict of interest between agent and principal. The research combined models from Crinchicy, Jensen, Jahera and Raymond (1999), and Chen and Steiner (1999) to construct five-regression policies model. We find interdependence relationship between managerial ownership, risk, dividend policy, institutional ownership, and leverage policy, We also find substitution effect between dividend policy and managerial ownership, and between managerial ownership and institutional ownership as predicted by agency theory. The substitution effect showed that ownership structure effectively used to reduce the agency problem between agent and principal. The study confirms that the relationship between risk and dividend is non-linear. Keyword: Agency Theory: Managerial Ownership: Risk