| Summary: | Divine rule (Hukm shar‘i) has classically been defined as: “The communication of God (khitab Allah)
concerning the conduct of the competent persons (af‘al al-mukallafin) by way of command (iqtida’), option
(takhyir) anddeclaration (wad‘)”(Badran, n.d.).Classically too, the three ways by which the communication of
Allah is concerned with the conduct of the competent person have been classified into two kinds: hukm taklifi
and hukm wad‘i.hukm taklifi is concerned with the conduct of the competent person by way of command or
option, and hukm wad‘i is concerned by way of declaration (Abd al-Wahhab, 1995).These two ways by which
hukm taklifi is concerned with the conduct of the competent person have been further classified into several
categories the number of which has been a subject of dispute. Dispute has also arisen over several issues
discussed under these categories disputed. These disputes have persisted for as long as hukm taklifi itself has
persisted, and therefore they are deemed to be inevitable. Some of these persistent disputes do not seem to be as
inevitable as they are thought to be, and therefore this paper will attempt to resolve them. These persistent
disputes pertain to the major classification of hukm taklifi into several categories as well as minor issues
involved by the categories concerned. As for the major classification, the paper will consider the contentions
made as to the number of its categories and the arguments made in their favour. As for the minor issues,
similarly, the paper will consider the contentions made as to their nature and the arguments made in their favour.
As for both, the paper will, having examined the arguments considered, prefer one contention to the other or
others or, if not, suggest an alternative to them all.Having considered the contentions made and the arguments
made in their favour, it is submitted that hukm taklifi is divisible into five categories as contended by the Jumhur
and not seven as contended by the Hanafis. As contended by the Jumhur, though in a slightly different mode of
reasoning, an act may be characterized by prohibition as well as obligation. Obligation, like prohibition, may
never be collective, however it, unlike prohibition, may be elective.
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