| Résumé: | Mindanaoâ��s Conflict has been one of conflicts that notoriously perpetuated
and unresolved. Negotiation regime of Final Peace Agreement 1996 � between the
government of the Philippines under Fidel Ramos�s administrative regime and
MNLF with the leadership of Nur Misuari � has been presumably, by many
scholars, a regime that acquainted with the features of resolving the conflict of
Mindanao. Nevertheless, such negotiation regime of Final Peace Agreement 1996
remains failed to overcome the Mindanao�s conflict.
In this dissertational research, the writer exemplified instrumentalist
approach in order to comprehensively analyze underlying factors of the negotiation
regime of Final Peace Agreement 1996. Explaining the influential features of
negotiation instrumentation to the regime�s incompetency in the context of conflict
resolution in Mindanao, the writer argues that negotiation instrumentation has been
understood as consequential strategy to overcome the problematic of actor�s
legitimacy and conflict of Mindanao simultaneously. The negotiation
instrumentation by particular actors, however, gives shape to the option of the
negotiation regime and the compromising notion focusing more on underscoring
the resolution of actors problematic rather than the deep-rooted problems of the
Mindanao�s conflict.
The research used qualitative research methodology with case study as the
ultimate strategy. Technique of collecting data was undertaken with in-depth
interview to several stakeholders in Mindanao�s conflict, negotiation practitioners
as well as previous researchers whose competencies and specializations in this
discourse. Besides, the research also underscored a series of interpretations of
numerous documentations during negotiation process such as Tripoli Agreement
1976, Jeddah Accord 1987, Final Peace Agreement 1996, and Republic Act 9045.
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