When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents?
Not always might is an asset; not always heavyweights win, and lightweights lose. Not all conflicts are two-person zero-sum games in which the winner’s gains equal to the loser's losses. Often, conflicts are “games” played by more than two players with varying skills and strengths; and gains an...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English English |
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IJAHSS
2022
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| Online Access: | https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/1/When-the-Weak-Survives_Final.pdf https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/2/IJAHSS0405076-184-192.pdf |
| _version_ | 1804072855127719936 |
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| author | Kersmo, Tadesse Biru |
| author_facet | Kersmo, Tadesse Biru |
| author_sort | Kersmo, Tadesse Biru |
| collection | LMU |
| description | Not always might is an asset; not always heavyweights win, and lightweights lose. Not all conflicts are two-person zero-sum games in which the winner’s gains equal to the loser's losses. Often, conflicts are “games” played by more than two players with varying skills and strengths; and gains and losses are distributed unevenly. A weak player can survive by exploiting the rivalry among stronger opponents. Political and economic contests are non-zero-sum games in which both competition and cooperation go together, and even the loser gets a stake. Based on a three-person three-way duel, this paper mathematically proves the proposition that, if played strategically, the weak can survive a conflict in a fight against far stronger opponents. The paper has limitations that are intrinsic to rational choice theory. The war between the State of Eritrea, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, and the Tigray Liberation Front can be analysed using this game model. So long, as there is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the chances of TPLF survival are extremely low. |
| first_indexed | 2024-07-09T04:05:46Z |
| format | Article |
| id | oai:repository.londonmet.ac.uk:8057 |
| institution | London Metropolitan University |
| language | English English |
| last_indexed | 2024-07-09T04:05:46Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | IJAHSS |
| record_format | eprints |
| spelling | oai:repository.londonmet.ac.uk:80572022-11-29T13:04:58Z http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/ When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? Kersmo, Tadesse Biru 320 Political science 330 Economics Not always might is an asset; not always heavyweights win, and lightweights lose. Not all conflicts are two-person zero-sum games in which the winner’s gains equal to the loser's losses. Often, conflicts are “games” played by more than two players with varying skills and strengths; and gains and losses are distributed unevenly. A weak player can survive by exploiting the rivalry among stronger opponents. Political and economic contests are non-zero-sum games in which both competition and cooperation go together, and even the loser gets a stake. Based on a three-person three-way duel, this paper mathematically proves the proposition that, if played strategically, the weak can survive a conflict in a fight against far stronger opponents. The paper has limitations that are intrinsic to rational choice theory. The war between the State of Eritrea, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, and the Tigray Liberation Front can be analysed using this game model. So long, as there is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the chances of TPLF survival are extremely low. IJAHSS 2022-09 Article PeerReviewed text en https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/1/When-the-Weak-Survives_Final.pdf text en https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/2/IJAHSS0405076-184-192.pdf Kersmo, Tadesse Biru (2022) When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? International Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Studies (IJAHSS), 4 (5). pp. 184-192. ISSN 2582-3647 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7289416 10.5281/zenodo.7289416 |
| spellingShingle | 320 Political science 330 Economics Kersmo, Tadesse Biru When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title | When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title_full | When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title_fullStr | When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title_full_unstemmed | When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title_short | When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? |
| title_sort | when the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents |
| topic | 320 Political science 330 Economics |
| url | https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/1/When-the-Weak-Survives_Final.pdf https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/8057/2/IJAHSS0405076-184-192.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kersmotadessebiru whentheweaksurvivestakingadvantageofrivalrybetweenstrongeropponents |