Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account
In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two we...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2022
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| _version_ | 1797112650439589888 |
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| author | Baysan, E Wildman, N |
| author_facet | Baysan, E Wildman, N |
| author_sort | Baysan, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness:
consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the
sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this
view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in
philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie
argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two
hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making
use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and
anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and antiphysicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding
zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of phy |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:28:32Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:000753a1-3963-4d8f-a043-7ddddd5d7fcb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:28:32Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:000753a1-3963-4d8f-a043-7ddddd5d7fcb2024-02-29T08:27:04ZPhysicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive accountJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:000753a1-3963-4d8f-a043-7ddddd5d7fcbEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2022Baysan, EWildman, NIn this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and antiphysicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of phy |
| spellingShingle | Baysan, E Wildman, N Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title | Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title_full | Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title_fullStr | Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title_full_unstemmed | Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title_short | Physicalism or anti-physicalism: a disjunctive account |
| title_sort | physicalism or anti physicalism a disjunctive account |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT baysane physicalismorantiphysicalismadisjunctiveaccount AT wildmann physicalismorantiphysicalismadisjunctiveaccount |