Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy?
Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted...
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| Format: | Book section |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2013
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| _version_ | 1797050210172534784 |
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| author | Fricker, L |
| author2 | O'Connor, T |
| author_facet | O'Connor, T Fricker, L |
| author_sort | Fricker, L |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances—there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one’s religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationality requires that one assess the credentials of those whom one trusts. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:01:48Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:0007f339-41a1-4132-84c0-e78e25364776 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:01:48Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:0007f339-41a1-4132-84c0-e78e253647762022-03-26T08:27:17ZEpistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy?Book sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248uuid:0007f339-41a1-4132-84c0-e78e25364776PhilosophyEnglishFaculty of PhilosophyOxford University Press2013Fricker, LO'Connor, TGoins, LRichard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances—there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one’s religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationality requires that one assess the credentials of those whom one trusts. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Fricker, L Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title | Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title_full | Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title_fullStr | Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title_short | Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy? |
| title_sort | epistemic trust in oneself and others an argument from analogy |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT frickerl epistemictrustinoneselfandothersanargumentfromanalogy |