Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy?
Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted...
Main Author: | Fricker, L |
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Other Authors: | O'Connor, T |
Format: | Book section |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2013
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Subjects: |
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