The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing

<p>This study explores the effect of opportunistic election timing on the incumbent’s electoral performance. While the existing literature on parliamentary dissolution and election timing does not directly address this question, we show that the theoretical implications which derive from it le...

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Main Authors: Schleiter, P, Tavits, M
Format: Journal article
Published: University of Chicago Press 2016
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author Schleiter, P
Tavits, M
author_facet Schleiter, P
Tavits, M
author_sort Schleiter, P
collection OXFORD
description <p>This study explores the effect of opportunistic election timing on the incumbent’s electoral performance. While the existing literature on parliamentary dissolution and election timing does not directly address this question, we show that the theoretical implications which derive from it lead to contradictory predictions about the ability of incumbent governments to benefit from strategically timed elections. We advance the theoretical debate by presenting the first cross-national comparative analysis of the electoral effects of opportunistic election timing, drawing on an original dataset of 318 parliamentary elections in 27 East and West European countries. In order to identify the effect of opportunistic election calling on incumbent’s electoral performance, we rely on instrumental variable regression. The results demonstrate that opportunistic election calling generates a vote share bonus for the incumbent of as much as 5 percentage points, and is thereby likely to affect electoral accountability. </p>
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spelling oxford-uuid:02ed3d5f-1c1e-4c54-8c8b-bd19cd30aeff2022-03-26T08:43:26ZThe electoral benefits of opportunistic election timingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:02ed3d5f-1c1e-4c54-8c8b-bd19cd30aeffSymplectic Elements at OxfordUniversity of Chicago Press2016Schleiter, PTavits, M<p>This study explores the effect of opportunistic election timing on the incumbent’s electoral performance. While the existing literature on parliamentary dissolution and election timing does not directly address this question, we show that the theoretical implications which derive from it lead to contradictory predictions about the ability of incumbent governments to benefit from strategically timed elections. We advance the theoretical debate by presenting the first cross-national comparative analysis of the electoral effects of opportunistic election timing, drawing on an original dataset of 318 parliamentary elections in 27 East and West European countries. In order to identify the effect of opportunistic election calling on incumbent’s electoral performance, we rely on instrumental variable regression. The results demonstrate that opportunistic election calling generates a vote share bonus for the incumbent of as much as 5 percentage points, and is thereby likely to affect electoral accountability. </p>
spellingShingle Schleiter, P
Tavits, M
The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title_full The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title_fullStr The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title_full_unstemmed The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title_short The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
title_sort electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing
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