Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary d...
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| Формат: | Journal article |
| Язык: | English |
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Elsevier
2008
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| _version_ | 1826257242108723200 |
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| author | Norman, T |
| author_facet | Norman, T |
| author_sort | Norman, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:15:02Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:04544a85-cf8d-4c74-9c1c-79b9cf10b002 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:15:02Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:04544a85-cf8d-4c74-9c1c-79b9cf10b0022022-03-26T08:51:10ZDynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:04544a85-cf8d-4c74-9c1c-79b9cf10b002EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier2008Norman, TEvolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process. |
| spellingShingle | Norman, T Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title | Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title_full | Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title_fullStr | Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title_short | Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. |
| title_sort | dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT normant dynamicallystablesetsininfinitestrategyspaces |