Health service gatekeepers
Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too weak incentives to investigate cost further when expected cost of treatment is greater than benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2003
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| _version_ | 1826257275205976064 |
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| author | Malcomson, J |
| author_facet | Malcomson, J |
| author_sort | Malcomson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too weak incentives to investigate cost further when expected cost of treatment is greater than benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too strong incentives when expected cost is less than benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without is unstable. With one scenario, patients always prefer the latter. With another, patients have incentives to acquire information that makes incentive contracts ineffective. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:15:35Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:04820da7-b6d1-4fc2-a933-5074c751a499 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:15:35Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:04820da7-b6d1-4fc2-a933-5074c751a4992022-03-26T08:52:09ZHealth service gatekeepersWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:04820da7-b6d1-4fc2-a933-5074c751a499Symplectic ElementsBulk import via SwordUniversity of Oxford2003Malcomson, JIncentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too weak incentives to investigate cost further when expected cost of treatment is greater than benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too strong incentives when expected cost is less than benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with an incentive contract and one without is unstable. With one scenario, patients always prefer the latter. With another, patients have incentives to acquire information that makes incentive contracts ineffective. |
| spellingShingle | Malcomson, J Health service gatekeepers |
| title | Health service gatekeepers |
| title_full | Health service gatekeepers |
| title_fullStr | Health service gatekeepers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Health service gatekeepers |
| title_short | Health service gatekeepers |
| title_sort | health service gatekeepers |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malcomsonj healthservicegatekeepers |