| Gaia: | <p>Sextus Empiricus’ account of Pyrrhonian Scepticism has been judged harshly in the history of philosophy. Since the verdict of Hume 1748 (12.128), Pyrrhonism has often been thought to be neither a worthwhile way of inquiring, nor a worthwhile way of life. This verdict is, I think, mistaken. My goal in this thesis is therefore to show that Sextus’ vision of Sceptical inquiry is more serious, sophisticated, and fruitful than it may seem, and thus can be the basis for a worthwhile life. I seek to show this in three stages.</p>
<p>In Section I, I discuss the interpretive problem of the scope of Scepticism, arguing for Barnes 1982’s reading: the scope will vary for each individual Sceptic’s exercise of her dunamis antithetikē. However, I raise a challenge for Barnes’ therapeutic reading, on the basis of Sextus’ insistence that the Sceptic is a zētētikos (PH I.7), and ‘keeps inquiring’ (PH I.1-3).</p>
<p>In Section II, I develop the concept of the dunamis antithetikē and assess its implications. First, I argue for a wide-scope interpretation of the dunamis antithetikē. Second, I examine the relationship of inquiry and therapy in Sextus, arguing that Sextus’ inquiry pursues tranquillity insofar as this is achievable through methods which he judges rational: rationality is Sextus’ epistemic telos, and Sextan ataraxia is reason-involving.</p>
<p>In Section III, I elaborate this into a vision of two stages in the Sceptic’s life as an inquirer, in which she explores two candidates for meeting the specifications of rational inquiry. In the first stage, she pursues the ideal of ‘critical rationality’: the exercise of the Modes, which is constitutive of the dunamis antithetikē, reveals to the Sceptic the impossibility of achieving this ideal. In the second stage, she pursues the ‘second-best’ ideal of ‘intuitive rationality’: this ‘post-Sceptical’ inquiry is founded on forms of reasoning which Sextus judges to be basic and unassailable, and involves the rationally governed redirection of our impressions (phantasiai).</p>
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