The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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CSAE (University of Oxford)
2008
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| _version_ | 1797051359262932992 |
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| author | Barr, A Serra, D |
| author_facet | Barr, A Serra, D |
| author_sort | Barr, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:18:24Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:056f6b1d-1a53-42df-924f-399b2f5f2478 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:18:24Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publisher | CSAE (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:056f6b1d-1a53-42df-924f-399b2f5f24782022-03-26T08:57:05ZThe effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experimentWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:056f6b1d-1a53-42df-924f-399b2f5f2478EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsCSAE (University of Oxford)2008Barr, ASerra, DUsing a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments. |
| spellingShingle | Barr, A Serra, D The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title | The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title_full | The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title_fullStr | The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title_full_unstemmed | The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title_short | The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
| title_sort | effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
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