| Summary: | In its original, pure form, the practice theory is an account of what it is to have an obligation. It holds that obligations are ultimately a social construct, made of shared attitudes to patterns of action. This chapter argues that, by restricting itself to social factors, the theory loses sight of the critical role of the normative. The chapter proposes an alternative explanation which holds that nonsocial normative factors explain why social practices matter transparently, taking into account all relevant considerations. It considers a mixed view, on which what people do in their social practice fixes the content of the standard or obligation that the practice constitutes, while some nonsocial, inherently normative factors give the socially defined standard or obligation binding force. A defence of the mixed view may be modelled on the idea of a normative power shared among members of a group. The chapter argues that such a defence would fail. Where a social practice emerges, appeal to shared powers would be redundant in an explanation of how it is that the practice may affect the normative situation. The chapter argues that the alternative transparent explanation accounts for the phenomena successfully.
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