Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was based on false premises, faulty assumptions, and a weak strategy. The conduct of operations has also been a failure: a coup de main that miscarried, poor air-land cooperation, inadequate tactical communications, substandard battle discipline, low morale, and vulnerab...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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US Army War College Press
2022
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| _version_ | 1826307509986525184 |
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| author | Johnson, R |
| author_facet | Johnson, R |
| author_sort | Johnson, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was based on false premises, faulty assumptions, and a weak strategy. The conduct of operations has also been a failure: a coup de main that miscarried, poor air-land cooperation, inadequate tactical communications, substandard battle discipline, low morale, and vulnerable and weak logistics. As the conflict has unfolded, heavy losses have imposed a strain on available Russian manpower. The Russian army reached a culminating point outside Kyiv and has exhibited little sign of operational learning. By contrast Ukrainians have fought an existential war, making good use of dispersed light infantry tactics with high levels of motivation. Their deficiencies in armaments and munitions have been compensated by Western support. However, the political context continues to impose limitations on the Ukrainians, and, at this early stage of the conflict, the number of options remains constrained. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:04:08Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:07958e8b-5fd2-4c61-8a85-b087f5a80a69 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:04:08Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | US Army War College Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:07958e8b-5fd2-4c61-8a85-b087f5a80a692022-04-25T16:12:02ZDysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:07958e8b-5fd2-4c61-8a85-b087f5a80a69EnglishSymplectic ElementsUS Army War College Press2022Johnson, RRussia’s invasion of Ukraine was based on false premises, faulty assumptions, and a weak strategy. The conduct of operations has also been a failure: a coup de main that miscarried, poor air-land cooperation, inadequate tactical communications, substandard battle discipline, low morale, and vulnerable and weak logistics. As the conflict has unfolded, heavy losses have imposed a strain on available Russian manpower. The Russian army reached a culminating point outside Kyiv and has exhibited little sign of operational learning. By contrast Ukrainians have fought an existential war, making good use of dispersed light infantry tactics with high levels of motivation. Their deficiencies in armaments and munitions have been compensated by Western support. However, the political context continues to impose limitations on the Ukrainians, and, at this early stage of the conflict, the number of options remains constrained. |
| spellingShingle | Johnson, R Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title | Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title_full | Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title_fullStr | Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title_short | Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022 |
| title_sort | dysfunctional warfare the russian invasion of ukraine 2022 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT johnsonr dysfunctionalwarfaretherussianinvasionofukraine2022 |