Conditionals and actuality
It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the t...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2009
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| _version_ | 1826257975492214784 |
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| author | Williamson, T |
| author_facet | Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve material equivalence). For a subjunctive conditional, the natural conclusion to draw is that it is non-congruential. It is much harder to defend the claim that an indicative conditional is non-congruential. The pressure to treat the indicative conditional as truth-functional is correspondingly greater. The implications of these results for attempts to interpret the indicative conditional as an epistemic or doxastic operator are assessed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:26:43Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:083924df-e9f7-4dfe-a576-5aca1e20c4f1 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T18:26:43Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:083924df-e9f7-4dfe-a576-5aca1e20c4f12022-03-26T09:11:45ZConditionals and actualityJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:083924df-e9f7-4dfe-a576-5aca1e20c4f1PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetSpringer2009Williamson, TIt is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve material equivalence). For a subjunctive conditional, the natural conclusion to draw is that it is non-congruential. It is much harder to defend the claim that an indicative conditional is non-congruential. The pressure to treat the indicative conditional as truth-functional is correspondingly greater. The implications of these results for attempts to interpret the indicative conditional as an epistemic or doxastic operator are assessed. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Williamson, T Conditionals and actuality |
| title | Conditionals and actuality |
| title_full | Conditionals and actuality |
| title_fullStr | Conditionals and actuality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conditionals and actuality |
| title_short | Conditionals and actuality |
| title_sort | conditionals and actuality |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont conditionalsandactuality |